Introduction
We study the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform (e.g., Firth et al., 2010) on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China (e.g., Bailey et al., 1999) . Previous studies have attributed this discount to a wide array of reasons, ranging from market illiquidity ) to information asymmetry (e.g., Chan et al., 2008) . We add to the literature on the Chinese foreign share discount by examining a unique research setting based on the effect of an exogenous regulatory change. The existing literature suggests that foreign investors are more concerned about the scope of expropriation by controlling insiders (e.g., Leuz et al., 2009 ), because foreigners have less local knowledge with which to detect such activities, than domestic investors. Prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that insulated them from the stock market performance of their firms, and therefore encouraged them to collude with managers and pursue self-serving activities at the expense of private investors. If the fear of insider expropriation under this split share structure at least partly contributed to the foreign share discount phenomenon in China, then we would expect the reforms to have alleviated this discount. Our study not only gains new insights into the underlying cause of the foreign share discount but also provides an empirical verification of the benefit of the Split Share Structure Reform, which is considered to be one of the most significant institutional changes in the Chinese stock market. Since China is an increasingly influential emerging country, the effect of its capital market reforms has policy implications for other transitional economies.
As a result of China's political ideology and transitional economy, the government maintains a high degree of ownership through state-affiliated shareholders in the majority of listed firms, to sustain its influence (e.g., Allen et al., 2005) . The existing literature stipulates two counteracting effects of ownership concentration on corporate governance (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002) . First, large shareholders can lead to an entrenchment effect (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Djankov et al., 2008) , which could impede corporate governance since their dominance over the control of the firm enables them to collude with management to expropriate the wealth of minority outside investors. Second, large shareholders can also be associated with an incentive alignment effect (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gomes, 2000) , which could enhance corporate governance if their interests and wealth are associated with the value of the firm they control. In the case of state shareholders in China, however, control and ownership concentration was maintained primarily through restricted shares, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform. Since these shares could not be traded in the stock exchange, the state shareholders were more interested in acquiring political credits or cash dividends. However, these pursuits may not necessarily be beneficial to their firms' market value and long-term growth, upon which private investors' wealth hinges. In other words, the split share structure of ownership in Chinese listed firms generated a conflict of interest between state and private shareholders. This tilted state shareholders toward the aforementioned entrenchment effect instead of the incentive alignment effect. By abolishing the split share structure, the state shareholders will benefit from increases in firms' market value, just as the private investors do. Thus, the Split Share Structure Reform should create a greater desire among state shareholders to monitor executives and ensure they maximize their firms' market value. This should foster the incentive alignment effect and ultimately benefit private investors.
The preference of foreign investors for well-governed firms is well-established in the literature. In a survey of global investors, McKinsey and Company (2002) show that corporate governance considerations dominate investment decisions, and over 60% of respondents state that they will avoid poorly governed firms. Leuz et al. (2009) show that foreigners do indeed invest less in poorly governed firms in countries with weak legal institutions. They suggest that poorly governed firms require more monitoring, which makes them more costly for foreign investors, who lack local knowledge to detect expropriation activities. They also argue that countries with weak legal institutions further increase the disadvantage for foreign investors, since insider relationships are more influential in controlling the firms. Due to the information disadvantage, foreign investors are also expected to benefit more from institutional reforms that reduce the scope of insiders' wealth expropriation from outsiders. For instance, Tan et al. (2011) show that there are greater increases in following and forecast accuracy among foreign analysts than local analysts after firms improve their corporate information environment. As a result of China's weak shareholder protection (e.g., Allen et al., 2005) and foreigners' lack of local knowledge, the entrenchment effect of state shareholders, encouraged by the split share structure, is expected to put off foreign investors more than domestic investors. An increase in the incentive alignment effect of state shareholders, promoted by the reform aimed at abolishing the split share structure, is expected be more beneficial to foreign investors than domestic investors.
The foreign share discount phenomenon in China has been well-documented in the literature (e.g., Chakravarty et al., 1998; Bailey et al., 1999; Fernald and Rogers, 2002) . Although China is not the only country with segmented stock markets, its foreign shares are widely traded at a discount (Bailey et al., 1999) . This unique phenomenon is considered to be a puzzle generally, because foreign investors are assumed to be more able to diversify their risk and should therefore demand lower returns than domestic investors, which in turn should lead to a foreign share premium instead of a discount. Several explanations have been put forward in the literature to explain the unique Chinese foreign share discount. These include B-share market illiquidity , limited domestic investment opportunities (Fernald and Rogers, 2002) , information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008) , domestic investor speculation (Mei et al., 2009) , and firms' governance qualities (Tong and Yu, 2011) .
However, to what extent the split share structure and its subsequent reform have influenced the foreign share discount in China, beyond the existing explanations provided by the literature, has not been examined. Some factors, such as liquidity, information asymmetry, speculation and governance characteristics, that are suggested by previous studies, can all be endogenously related to the foreign share discount. In contrast, the Split Share Structure Reform provides a unique research setting for us to empirically observe whether an exogenously-induced reduction in the conflict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders could alleviate foreign investors' concerns over insider expropriation. In fact, some of the existing explanations provided by the literature on Chinese foreign share discounts, such as liquidity, information asymmetry and governance qualities, may in fact be manifestations of the deeper underlying conflict between shareholder groups that we can observe by studying the effects of this reform. Firms with insiders who are more likely to pursue self-serving activities under the split share structure are also more likely to have higher information asymmetry, since the insiders have greater incentives to withhold sensitive information. Such firms are also less likely to attract foreign investors, which in turn decreases their market liquidity. To cover up insider expropriation, such firms are also more likely to reduce levels of governance, for example by appointing a less independent board. Of course, we do not stipulate that the Split Share Structure Reform will completely eliminate the foreign share discount. This is because other institutional factors, such as the lack of alternative investment channels for domestic investors, which also contribute to the phenomenon (Fernald and Rogers, 2002) , persist. Our specific prediction is that the split share structure contributed significantly to the foreign share discount on Chinese listed firms under state control or with more restricted shares.
To carry out our analyses, we sample all A-and B-share dual-listed Chinese firms in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period from 2001 to 2008. For each firm, we identify the year in which the negotiations over compensation to holders of tradable shares were completed and the process of reform began. We classify firms that are controlled by state shareholders, or have above the yearly cross-sectional median proportion of restricted shares, as our treatment group, since we assume that such firms are more sensitive to the influence of the Split Share Structure Reform. We classify firms that are controlled by private shareholders, or have below the yearly cross-sectional median proportion of restricted shares, as our control group, since we assume that such firms are less sensitive to the reform. To draw the inference that the foreign share discount has indeed been reduced by the reform, instead of some other unidentified background reasons, such as a time trend or macro-economic factors, we must observe a significantly more pronounced reduction in the treatment than in the control group, after the reform.
Our findings are as follows. Among firms under state control or with a higher proportion of restricted shares (i.e., our treatment group), we observe a significantly higher foreign share discount than among their counterparts, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform. This confirms our conjecture that foreign investors are concerned about the corporate governance of Chinese state-controlled listed firms and incorporate this into the discount rate they attach to Chinese listed firms. One can interpret this pre-reform finding as an inverse relationship between corporate governance and the foreign share discount, which is broadly in line with Tong and Yu (2011) , although their analyses are based on an earlier sample period of 1998 to 2005 and they do not look at state control or restricted shares. Following the reform, we find original evidence of a significantly more pronounced reduction in the foreign share discount among firms in our treatment group, relative to those in our control group. Evidence of a greater effect among Chinese listed firms that are sensitive to the reform confirms our prediction that an exogenous reduction in the conflict of interests between the dominant state shareholder and the minority private shareholders after the reform reduces the foreign share discount. This is consistent with the reduction of the scope of insider expropriation benefiting foreign investors more as a result of their limited local knowledge relative to domestic investors. Our findings are robust to several dimensions of controls, such as determinants of the Chinese foreign share discount that have been identified in the literature (i.e., market liquidity, information asymmetry, investor speculation and governance qualities), determinants of investors required returns (i.e., size, leverage, growth, profitability and risk), as well as firm, industry, year and regional fixed effects.
Our findings contribute to several strands of the academic literature. In relation to the growing literature on economic development in China, we show that the Split Share Structure Reform has had a beneficial impact on the capital market of this transitional economy. Evidence of a reduction in the required rate of return demanded by foreign investors since the reform suggests a decline in the risk perceived by outside investors. This in turn decreases the firms' cost of raising equity capital. In terms of the literature on corporate governance, we provide an example of how the conflict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders can be reduced exogenously through regulatory intervention. In a transitional economy where shareholder protection and legal enforcement are weak, the influence of outside investors may not be enough to motivate firms to improve corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, public policy may be required to stimulate change. Finally, we add to the established literature on the Chinese foreign share discount puzzle an alternative explanatory factor, that is, the concern over the state control of listed firms under the split share structure. Our findings confirm that foreign investors are more concerned about this issue than domestic investors.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, explains the institutional background and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and methodologies.
Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Literature and hypotheses

The Chinese stock market
China established the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early 1990s to promote economic development by encouraging firms to obtain external funding. China's stock market has experienced significant growth in parallel with its economy. For instance, the market capitalization of China's stock market was already the largest among developing countries by 2001, and it is currently the second largest in the world, with only the United States' stock market larger.
1 The success and experience of Chinese economic growth has useful implications for other emerging countries. Thus, there is increasing interest in the academic literature in examining the development of the Chinese economy and capital market. due to their experience and expertise. Foreign investors are also assumed to be better able to diversify their risk than domestic investors. These arguments imply that foreign investors will require lower returns, which seems to apply to all countries except for China in the study by Bailey et al. (1999) . Other studies (e.g., Brennan and Cao, 1997; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) argue that foreign investors have informational, linguistic, and cultural disadvantages. These qualities imply that foreign investors will require higher returns, which seems to apply to China but not to other countries.
More direct explanations relating to the Chinese setting have been put forward to address the foreign share discount puzzle. Fernald and Rogers (2002) suggest that Chinese investors have lower expected returns due to the lack of alternative investment channels. Apart from shares, their primary investment outlet is bank deposits, which pay less than the international level of interest rates. Although this argument explains why A-shares would be traded at a premium relative to B-shares, it does not address cross-sectional variations in this premium across firms. Chakravarty et al. (1998) and Chan et al. (2008) document that information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors explains a portion of the cross-sectional variation in the Chinese foreign share discount. This is consistent with the suggestion of Merton (1987) that investors are more reluctant to hold stocks associated with poorer information environments. suggest the trading activity explanation, which stipulates that the discount is due to lower liquidity in the B-share market. This is in line with the argument of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) that investors require higher returns to compensate for the higher trading costs associated with illiquid stocks, and therefore attach a higher discount rate to them. Mei et al. (2009) argue that domestic investors' speculation contributes to the cross-sectional variation in the A-share premium. This is based on the theoretical model of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , which suggests there is a speculative component in asset pricing. Tong and Yu (2011) argue that the B-share discount is higher among firms with weaker governance qualities, such as a less independent board. This is broadly consistent with the analyses of Bai et al. (2004) , which show that corporate governance measures impact the Tobin's Q of Chinese firms.
The discounting of Chinese listed firms by foreign investors also provides a useful platform on which to evaluate the economic consequences of this unprecedented institutional reform in
China. It provides an empirically observable measure of the discount rate to overcome the widely recognized inaccuracy of estimates based on asset pricing (e.g., Fama and French, 1997; Elton, 1999) and valuation (e.g., Easton and Monahan, 2005 ) models.
The ownership structure in China
Ownership structure literature stipulates that it is possible for large shareholders to play a positive role in corporate governance, since through their power and expertise they can reduce the agency problem more effectively than minority shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Admati et al., 1994; Maug, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Noe, 2002 ). An incentive alignment effect occurs when large shareholders incur a greater cost from a decline in their firm's value than they could gain from diverting their firm's cash flow into their own pockets. Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) show there is increased management turnover in the presence of large shareholders. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) find tighter executive compensation controls under large shareholders. Gomes (2000) suggests that a high degree of ownership concentration also serves as a signal for reputation-building by controlling owners. To the extent that large shareholders can improve corporate governance and decrease agency costs, they are also expected to influence firm valuation by reducing the firm's cost of capital.
Lombardo and Pagano (2002) suggest that investors require higher returns to compensate for the monitoring costs of poorly governed firms. Corporate governance also decreases the cost of capital by discouraging insider trading (e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2003) . Better governance can also reduce the non-diversifiable risk of expropriation by corporate insiders during market downturns (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005) . (2006) show that executive remuneration is only sensitive to share return performance in privately-controlled Chinese listed firms.
The entrenchment effect of state shareholder in China is exacerbated by the institutional environment, such as the use of restricted shares to maintain such ownership. Therefore, the Split Share Structure Reform provides a useful opportunity to evaluate how state ownership affects the valuation of Chinese listed firms.
The Split Share Structure Reform in China
Under the split share structure, the shares of Chinese listed firms were classified into restricted and freely-traded shares. There were two kinds of restricted shares: state and legal-person shares. The former were held by central and local governments through their bureaucratic agencies or affiliated state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The latter could be held by any of the above, or by private entities. Restricted shares could not be freely traded in the stock exchanges and could only be transferred in two ways. First, they could be transferred with the authorities' approval, in which case the transfer price was often set near the book value. Second, they could be auctioned, also with a substantial illiquidity discount on their value. The documented illiquidity discounts, due to the lack of tradability, are nearly 80% in Chen and
Xiong (2001), Chen et al. (2008) , Huang and Xu (2009), and Hou and Howell, (2011) . Even after the transfer or auction, these shares would remain restricted and could not be traded in the stock exchanges. The split share structure essentially catered for the socio-political ideology of China. On the one hand, the government wished to maintain its influence in listed firms, in order to achieve political and social objectives. On the other hand, it also wanted their controlled firms to reduce their dependence on state subsidies and increase their ability to raise capital through the equity market. Nevertheless, this split share structure reduced the quality of firms' corporate governance and the efficiency of their performance (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008) . To accommodate further economic development, China recognized the need to modernize its capital market by abolishing this split share structure across listed firms.
After a previously unsuccessful attempt in 2001 (e.g., Kim et al., 2003) So, has the Split Share Structure Reform benefitted the Chinese listed firms and their minority shareholders? This is a crucial research question that deserves to be addressed given the significance of this reform to the development of the Chinese capital market. Our study seeks to answer this question by providing original empirical evidence of the economic consequences of this reform.
Hypothesis development
We synthesize the aforementioned literature on the Chinese foreign share discount, ownership structure, and the Share Structure Reform, to generate our research hypotheses. The existing literature shows findings that are consistent with the foreign share discount being higher among firms with less liquidity, more information asymmetry, and greater monitoring costs. However, this evidence may only be associating the foreign share discount with the symptoms of some deeper underlying problems, one of which could be the split share structure It is important to clarify that we are definitely not stipulating that the foreign share discount phenomenon was only and entirely driven by the split share structure of ownership among
Chinese listed firms. The objective of our study is to determine whether the split share structure contributed significantly to foreign investors' discounting of Chinese listed firms. There could be other unidentified factors in the Chinese institutional environment that continue to cause this discount even after the Split Share Structure Reform. For instance, the lack of alternative investment channels for Chinese domestic investors, which reduces their required returns relative to those of foreign investors (Fernald and Rogers, 2002) , may continue to cause the foreign share discount phenomenon among A-and B-share dual-listed firms. Thus, we do not expect that the reform will have completely eliminated the entire Chinese foreign share discount puzzle. The specific prediction of our hypothesis H 2 is that there should be a significantly greater reduction in the foreign share discount among state-controlled listed firms than among privately-controlled listed firms, and among listed firms with more restricted shares in comparison to those with fewer restricted shares.
Firms under state control or which have a higher proportion of restricted to total shares serve as the treatment group in our test of the impact of the reform, while those under private control or which have a lower proportion of restricted shares serve as our control group. If we observe a drop in the foreign share discount that is, however, not more significant among firms in the treatment group than among those in the control group, then we will not be able to infer that it is the Split Share Structure Reform that has brought about the decline. In turn, this would also weaken the inference that it is the poor corporate governance, caused by the possession of restricted shares by the dominant shareholders of state-controlled listed firms, that contributes to the foreign share discount in China. On the other hand, if we observe a significantly greater decline in the foreign share discount in the treatment than in the control group, then this would reduce the possibility that the drop is due to other unidentified background reasons, such as a time trend or business cycles.
Around the period when the Split Share Structure Reform was implemented, there are two alternative effects that could influence our evidence. First, the financial crisis that began in late 2007 could add noise to our analyses. However, this would be likely to affect the share prices of firms in both our treatment and our control group, simultaneously. In the case of flight to quality, foreign investors are more likely to ditch firms they deem less desirable, such as those in our treatment group, with a higher perceived agency problem. Thus, if anything, the financial crisis should work against us finding results in favor of our predictions. Second, the Chinese convergence to the IFRS also overlaps with our post-reform period. If IFRS indeed strengthens
Chinese listed firms' accounting quality, then this may also reduce the firm-specific discount rate. However, Chinese listed firms that issue B-shares have long been reporting under both the original domestic accounting standard and IFRS. As a result, the IFRS convergence is not expected to influence the A-and B-share dual-listing Chinese firms in our sample.
There are also two possible counterarguments against our hypothesis H 2 . The first critique is that, even after trading restrictions have been abolished, the state shareholders may still be unlikely to sell their shares due to government pressure. Thus, there may be no incentive alignment effect achieved through the reform at all. However, this critique neglects the established Chinese government policy known as "Zhua Da Fang Xiao", which seeks to sustain ownership only in strategic enterprises (e.g., energy, transportation, aerospace, defense, etc.)
and encourages the relaxation of control among less essential businesses. 2 Anecdotal evidence from the media also shows that some previously restricted shares held by state shareholders have been traded in the stock market following this reform. 3 Even if state shareholders do not race to trade their shares immediately once they are allowed to, this does not mean that they have no incentive to want to see an increase in their firms' market performance. This is because they could be holding on to the shares in anticipation of the long-term growth of their firms' market value. The second critique is that there is no incentive alignment effect until all of the restricted shares of a firm become fully tradable, in other words, 36 months after the ratification of the compensation plan in the reform process of each firm. According to this critique, it will only be possible to examine the impact of the reform across all firms in the Chinese stock market using a post-2011 sample. Thus, our study will not capture any incentive alignment effect associated with the reform. However, this critique is hinged on the narrow assumption identify profitable investment projects and boost the market value of a firm, so it is unlikely that the restricted shareholders would have waited until the day their shares became tradable to begin such efforts. Section 2.4 mentioned that restricted shareholders were able to sell all or a portion of their holdings within the 36-month horizon, depending on the proportion of the firm they owned. Thus, this critique also completely ignores the wealth implications of a rising share price for the restricted shareholders over this period. 
Sample and methodology
Test of hypotheses
The dependent variable FSD i,t is the foreign share discount of firm i at the end of month t, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. Based on this construction, a higher FSD i,t value indicates a greater foreign share discount. We use two key variables to test our hypotheses. TREAT i,t is assigned the value 1 for firms in our treatment group and 0 otherwise. POST i,t equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. Firms are allocated to the treatment (control) group if they are state-(privately-) controlled or have above (below) the yearly cross-sectional median level of the ratio of restricted to total shares. These two different ways of identifying the firms in our treatment group serve as a mutual robustness check to increase the rigor of our findings. We define the post-reform period for each firm as starting from the year when the restricted shareholders completed their compensation negotiations with the freely tradable shareholders and commenced the process of eliminating the restricted shares. Although not all restricted shares were immediately rendered tradable, the price should be forward-looking and we expect that the foreign investors' perceived risk toward these firms should have already started to change once the abolishment of all restricted shares became imminent. The interaction term TREAT i,t  POST i,t enables us to test the incremental effect of the reform on the foreign share discount among the firms in our treatment group. If the coefficient  1 > 0, this will indicate a greater foreign share discount in the treatment group than in the control group before the reform, which will confirm our hypothesis H 1 . If the coefficient  3 < 0, this will indicate a greater reduction of the foreign share discount in the treatment group than in the control group after the reform, which will confirm our hypothesis H 2 .
We include four sets of control variables. The first set addresses the information asymmetry (e.g., Chan et al., 2008) , market liquidity , and investor speculation (Mei et al., 2009 ) explanations put forward in the literature to address the Chinese foreign share discount. RMV i,t-1 is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-shares to B-shares at the end of the previous month. Information asymmetry is expected to be greater among firms with a lower A-share market capitalization, since such firms are smaller. RTO i,t-1 is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. Liquidity is assumed to be higher among firms with higher turnover. RRET i,t-1 is the ratio of the stock returns of A-to B-shares in the last month. Speculation is likely to be greater in stocks with higher past returns. This variable also controls for the relative price movement between A-and B-shares of the same firm. These three control variables are based on data available from the stock market and so we can update them on a monthly basis as we can for the dependent variable.
The second set of control variables includes determinants of the cost of equity capital.
LEV i,t-1 is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year, which captures financial risk. SALE i,t-1 is the percentage change in sales growth in the last fiscal year, which serves as a proxy for demand-side growth. IROA i,t-1 is the industry median-adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets; this measure captures the profitability of the firm. TQ i,t-1 is the Tobin's Q in the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity, which captures firm performance. BETA i,t-1 captures systematic risk exposure and is measured as CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI i,t-1 is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year and serves as a proxy for changes in the firm-specific information environment. The share price informativeness measure is calculated as the log of
where R 2 is the goodness-of-fit measure based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns, following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) . 4 The construction of these control variables either requires data available from the financial statements (e.g., leverage, sales, profitability, and Tobin's Q) or estimation through past historical return data (e.g., beta and price informativeness). Thus, we update them on an annual frequency, based on the previous fiscal year-end values.
The third set of control variables includes corporate governance qualities, which not only affect the cost of equity capital (e.g., Lombardo and Pagano, 2002) but has also been used to explain the Chinese foreign share discount (Tong and Yu, 2011 Finally, we also include three sets of dummy variables that control for industry (Industry), year (Year), and regional (Area) fixed effects, respectively. This is because state ownership, corporate governance, and foreign investor preferences may vary over time across different industries, and because of disparities in regional development. We define industry according to the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) code. We define region based on Firth et al. (2006), who group firms into four different regions based on economic development level. We define industry according to the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) code. We define region based on Firth et al. (2006), who group firms into four different regions based on economic development level. To further ensure the robustness of our results, we also replicate our analyses by controlling for firm fixed effects and by bootstrapped median regression. to compute variables such as the foreign share discount, state control status, the proportion of restricted shares, the firm-specific year of reform, market capitalization, turnover, stock returns, debt-to-equity ratio, the return on assets ratio, Tobin's Q, share price informativeness, ownership concentration, CEO ownership, CEO duality, the number of outside directors, the number of board meetings, board size, and industrial and regional classifications. We obtain Chinese domestic market returns from Datastream and the U.S. stock market returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). To deal with outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of all our regression variables, except those that are constructed as dummy variables.
Sample description, summary statistics, and correlation matrix
We include all listed firms that issue both A-and B-shares in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We exclude firms that were listed on the stock exchanges after the reform was launched at the end of 2005, as they did not adopt a split share structure. Finally, our sample requires all of the aforementioned variables to have valid values and includes a total of 5,870 firm-month observations. [insert Tables 1 and 2 here] Turning to hypothesis H 2 , notice throughout Table 3 that the coefficients pertaining to the interaction term TREATPOST are all significantly negative. This indicates that the state-controlled firms in our treatment group experienced a significantly greater reduction in their foreign share discount after the reform, than the privately-controlled firms in our control group. Although the negative coefficients of POST indicate that the control group also experienced a reduction, it was significantly less than for the treatment group.
Empirical findings
Treatment group based on state-controlled firms
Privately-controlled firms may have experienced a reduction for two reasons. First, it could be the result of a background time trend, unrelated to the reform. Second, such firms may also have received corporate governance benefits from the reform, since they may also have had state shareholders and restricted shares. However, the effect is thought to be less since the conflict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders caused by the split share structure would have been less severe. The coefficients of TREATPOST confirm the predictions of our hypothesis H 2 . They also suggest that the benefit of the reform has economic significance.
This finding has two key implications. First, the Split Share Structure Reform has indeed reduced the foreign share discount, since we observe a greater impact on Chinese state-controlled listed firms that would have been more sensitive to its effects. We provide original evidence that this major change in the institutional settings of the Chinese stock market has yielded favorable economic consequences. To be specific, we show that this reform could have reduced the costs of Chinese state-controlled firms' acquisition of foreign equity capital.
Second, the split share structure did indeed contribute to the foreign share discount among
Chinese state-controlled listed firms, because we see a significant decline after the reform. To be specific, foreign investors' discount of Chinese state-controlled listed firms was significantly driven by the higher perceived risk associated with the scope for insider expropriation under the split share structure.
Our findings are robust to the controls of the determinants of the Chinese foreign share discount established in the literature, as well as factors that are likely to influence equity investors' required returns. Control variables that are consistently significant across all four regressions in Table 3 have robust relationships with the foreign share discount. The coefficients of RTO are significantly positive, which indicates that foreign investors set higher discounts for stocks that are less liquid in the B-share market, which is consistent with . The required returns of foreign investors are higher for firms with higher growth (SALE), and lower for firms with above industry median profitability (IROA). These findings are all pro-intuitive. Our findings are also robust to controls of industry, year, regional, and firm fixed effects, as well as to bootstrapped median regression.
[insert Table 3 here]
Treatment group based on above median level of restricted to total shares ratio
Table 4 presents our tests of hypotheses H 1 and H 2 using firms with above (below) median level of restricted to total shares ratio as our treatment (control) group. Across all four regressions, the coefficients of TREAT are significantly positive. This indicates that firms with a higher proportion of restricted shares, which make up our treatment group, were associated with a higher foreign share discount before the Split Share Structure Reform was enacted. This finding is in line with the prediction in our hypothesis H 1 and suggests that foreign investors indeed required a higher rate of returns from Chinese listed firms with more ownership maintained through restricted shares, which was likely to exacerbate the conflict of interests between shareholders and impede the effectiveness of the corporate governance role of ownership. This finding serves as a mutual robustness check of our evidence in Table 3 , which uses state-controlled firms as the treatment group. In fact, using the ratio of restricted to total shares gives us an even more direct measure with which to capture the impact of the split share structure on the foreign share discount. Thus, we provide direct evidence that the split share structure contributes to the foreign share discount in China.
In terms of hypothesis H 2 , the coefficients pertaining to the interaction term TREATPOST are significantly negative throughout Table 4 . This indicates that the firms with more restricted shares, in our treatment group, are associated with a significantly greater decline in the B-share discount after the Split Share Structure Reform, than the firms with fewer restricted shares, in our control group. Although the control group also experienced a reduction, as indicated by the negative coefficients of POST, the effect was significantly less than among the treatment group.
As mentioned earlier, the control group may have experienced a foreign share discount reduction but this could be due to confounding effects unrelated to the reform. Alternatively, it may have been caused by the corporate governance benefits of the reform, since such firms did also have state shareholders and restricted shares. However, the effect would be expected to be weaker, since the impact of abolishing the restricted shares for such firms would have been less than for those in the treatment group. Our prediction in hypothesis H 2 is thus confirmed in Table   4 by the coefficients of TREATPOST. This further strengthens the two key inferences we draw from Table 3 , since our results are not affected by alternative definitions of the treatment group.
[insert Table 4 here]
Robustness checks
Tables 5 and 6 present further robustness tests. 5 In Table 5 we substitute the treatment group dummy variable in Equation 1 directly by state ownership ratio (SOR) in Panel A or restricted share ratio (RSR) in Panel B. 6 Notice that the coefficients of SOR and RSR are significantly positive. This indicates that firms with higher state ownership ratio or higher restricted shares ratio are also associated with higher foreign share discount prior to the reform. The coefficients of SORPOST and RSRPOST are significantly negative. This indicates that the foreign share discounts associated with such firms are incrementally lower after the reform. These results suggest that our main findings in Tables 3 and 4 are not specific only to the use of treatment group dummy variables in the regression analyses. In Table 6 we substitute foreign share discount (FSD) with A-share price minus B-share price following Chan et al. (2008) . The treatment group is defined as state controlled firms in Panel A (as in Table 3 ) and above median level restricted share ratio firms in Panel B (as in Table 4 ). The coefficients of TREAT are consistently and significantly positive and the coefficients of TREATPOST are also consistently and significantly negative. These findings suggest that our main results in Tables 3   and 4 are not sensitive to alternative definition of foreign share discount.
[insert Tables 5 and 6 here]
Conclusion
China is a fast-growing and increasingly influential emerging economy. Studies of Chinese capital market issues are attracting increasing attention from academics, practitioners, and regulators. We intersect two important topics in this literature, namely, the reform of the split share structure (e.g. Firth et al., 2010; Cummings and Hou, 2012) , and the foreign share discount puzzle (e.g. Chan et al., 2008) . We provide original evidence addressing both topics, by confirming that the split share structure of ownership significantly contributed to the foreign share discount among Chinese listed firms under state control, and those with more restricted shares. Our analysis controls for alternative explanations put forward in the literature to explain the foreign share discount, such as liquidity, information asymmetry and governance qualities.
Future studies could seek to identify other possible factors in the Chinese institutional environment that also contribute to the discounting of listed firms by foreign investors. For instance, if the lack of alternative investment channels for Chinese domestic investors also contributes (Fernald and Rogers, 2002) , then researchers could attempt to validate this explanation following the enactment of relevant institutional reforms in the future. Another possible extension of our study would be to evaluate the impact of the Split Share Structure
Reform on firms that issue both A-shares traded in mainland China's stock exchanges and H-shares traded in Hong Kong's stock exchange. To avoid the influence of institutional differences between mainland China and Hong Kong, our study focuses only on firms that issue A-and B-shares, both of which are traded in mainland China's stock exchanges.
In terms of policy implications, we suggest that, through the maintenance of state control by holding restricted shares, the dominant shareholders were deprived of wealth gains from share price rises and therefore had fewer incentives to monitor managers and ensure they maximized their firms' market value. In other words, the split share structure encouraged the entrenchment effect of state shareholders, and increased their incentive to collude with executives in the expropriation of the wealth of private investors. Since foreign investors lack local knowledge, they are more concerned about the scope for insider expropriation than domestic investors are.
As a result of greater monitoring costs, foreign investors will also charge a higher required return than domestic investors for compensation. The elimination of trading constraints has made the wealth of dominant shareholders sensitive to share price movements in the market.
This has improved the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, which will in turn discourage insider expropriation. Due to the informational disadvantage for foreign investors, the reforms are expected to lower the monitoring costs and therefore the required returns of foreign investors, more than those of domestic investors. Thus, we provide empirical evidence that the Split Share Structure Reform, which is one of the most important changes to have been made to the institutional settings of the Chinese stock market, has been beneficial to minority investors and firms alike. The minority investors have benefited from better protection of their wealth, while firms have benefited from a reduction in the cost of equity capital from foreign investors. Both are likely to strengthen the efficiency of the Chinese stock market in allocating capital, which is crucial to the further sustained growth of the country's economy. FSD i,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. SOR is state ownership ratio measured as yearly number of state shares divided by total number of shares. RSR is restricted shares ratio measured as yearly number of restricted shares divided by total number of shares. POST equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of Ato B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin's Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1-R 2 )/R 2 ] where R 2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75 th or below bottom 25 th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. FSD i,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. SOR is state ownership ratio measured as yearly number of state shares divided by total number of shares. RSR is restricted shares ratio measured as yearly number of restricted shares divided by total number of shares. POST equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns on A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio in the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in the sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is Tobin's Q of the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1-R 2 )/R 2 ] where R 2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75 th or below bottom 25 th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms which held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose boards in the last fiscal year were larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. * denotes 1% level significance. TREAT is set to 1 for state-controlled firms, and 0 otherwise. POST equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns on A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio in the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in the sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is Tobin's Q of the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1-R 2 )/R 2 ] where R 2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75 th or below bottom 25 th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms which held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose boards in the last fiscal year were larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Regression 1 (2) excludes (includes) the controls for industry, year, and regional fixed-effects. Regression 3 (4) applies firm fixed-effect control (bootstrapped median regression). Regressions 1 to 3 report the adjusted R 2 and t-statistics, adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression 4 reports the pseudo R , and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] and includes A-and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The dependent variable FSD is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. SOR is state ownership ratio measured as yearly number of state shares divided by total number of shares. RSR is restricted shares ratio measured as yearly number of restricted shares divided by total number of shares. POST equals to 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan of the reform was ratified for the firm in question and for all years afterwards, and to 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns on A-to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio in the last fiscal year.
SALE is the percentage change in the sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is Tobin's Q of the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1-R 2 )/R 2 ] where R 2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75 th or below bottom 25 th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms which held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose boards in the last fiscal year were larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Regression 2 is based on bootstrapped median regression and reports pseudo R 2 .
* , ** , and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. 
